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Supervised by Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of The People's Republic of China Sponsored by Harbin Institute of Technology Editor-in-chief Yu Zhou ISSNISSN 1005-9113 CNCN 23-1378/T

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Related citation:Yi-Yong Lin,You-Song Wang.Design Capability Identify under Asymmetric Information[J].Journal of Harbin Institute Of Technology(New Series),2013,20(6):9-14.DOI:10.11916/j.issn.1005-9113.2013.06.002.
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Design Capability Identify under Asymmetric Information
Author NameAffiliation
Yi-Yong Lin School of Civil Engineering and Transportation, South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China 
You-Song Wang School of Civil Engineering and Transportation, South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China 
Abstract:
Under the condition of asymmetric information, the Spence’s Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however, since the “prior probability” and “posterior probability” have great uncertainties, the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions, this paper provides a design capability screening model, which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard, so it is of significant application value.
Key words:  Spence’s Job Market Signaling Model  reverse selection  design capability  risk analysis  asymmetric information
DOI：10.11916/j.issn.1005-9113.2013.06.002
Clc Number:TU9
Fund:

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