| 引用本文: | 程国柱,刘轩龄,冯天军.行为经济学视角下城市居民出行方式选择演化博弈模型[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2024,56(7):102.DOI:10.11918/202303030 |
| CHENG Guozhu,LIU Xuanling,FENG Tianjun.Evolutionary model of transportation mode choice for urban residents from the perspective of behavioral economics[J].Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology,2024,56(7):102.DOI:10.11918/202303030 |
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| 摘要: |
| 为了解城市居民出行方式选择过程,完善公交优先策略的管控措施,对城市居民出行方式选择演化博弈模型展开研究。基于行为经济学理论,以前景理论为基础,引入心理账户理论,构建收益账户和损失账户。运用演化博弈理论,构建出行者与政府部门之间的演化博弈模型,通过复制动态方程分析双方策略的动态演化过程及稳定性条件。给出了系统最优状态与系统波动状态的约束条件,并从政府部门感知与出行者感知两方面解释了现实情况下,演化趋势未能达到理想状态的主要原因,提出目前政府部门管控措施存在的主要问题。运用MATLAB进行数值仿真,引入政府补贴动态绩效支付模式对模型进行优化,得到稳定状态下出行者选择公交出行概率为0.33,政府参与管控的概率为0.92,并进行了效价参数敏感性分析。研究结果表明:政府应主要从降低公交出行费用、适当提高私家车的出行费用成本以及缩短公交出行时间等方面优化公交管控策略,才能显著提升城市居民选择公交出行的概率。研究成果能够为城市交通出行规划与公交优先策略优化提供理论依据。 |
| 关键词: 交通规划 出行方式 管控策略 前景理论 心理账户 演化博弈 |
| DOI：10.11918/202303030 |
| 分类号:U491.1 |
| 文献标识码:A |
| 基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2572023CT21)；吉林省科技发展计划(20220402030GH) |
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| Evolutionary model of transportation mode choice for urban residents from the perspective of behavioral economics |
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CHENG Guozhu1,LIU Xuanling1,FENG Tianjun2
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(1.School of Civil Engineering & Transportation, Northeast Forestry University, Harbin 150040, China; 2.School of Transportation Science and Engineering, Jilin University of Architecture, Changchun 130118, China)
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| Abstract: |
| In order to enhance the control measures of the public transportation priority policy and understand the mode choice process of urban residents for travel, a research was conducted to investigate the evolutionary game model of mode choice for urban residents. The study was based on the principles of behavioral economics theory and prospect theory, and incorporated the concept of mental accounting by constructing profit and loss accounts. Using evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary game model was developed between travelers and government agencies. The dynamic evolution process and stability conditions of both parties′ strategies were analyzed using replicator dynamics equations. The research identified the constraints of the system′s optimal state and system fluctuation state. Moreover, the main reasons for the deviation from the ideal state of the evolutionary trend in reality were explained from the perspectives of government perception and traveler perception. Additionally, the study identified the main problems of the current government control measures. Numerical simulations were conducted using MATLAB, and an optimization model with a dynamic performance payment mode for government subsidies was introduced. The research findings showed that the stable probability of travelers choosing public transportation was 0.33, and the probability of government participation in control was 0.92. Sensitivity analysis of the utility parameters was also conducted. The results of the study indicate that the government should focus on optimizing its public transportation control strategy by reducing the cost of public transportation, appropriately increasing the cost of private car travel, and shortening the travel time of public transportation. This would significantly increase the probability of urban residents choosing public transportation. In summary, the research provides a theoretical basis for urban transportation planning and public transportation priority policy optimization. |
| Key words: transportation planning transportation mode control strategy prospect theory mental accounting evolutionary game |
