| 引用本文: | 赵俊,陈旭梅,刘志硕,栾迪.航权资源双边谈判的序贯互惠博弈建模与分析[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2022,54(3):1.DOI:10.11918/202112043 |
| ZHAO Jun,CHEN Xumei,LIU Zhishuo,LUAN Di.Modeling and analysis of sequential reciprocal game problem of bilateral negotiation for air traffic rights resources[J].Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology,2022,54(3):1.DOI:10.11918/202112043 |
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| 摘要: |
| 针对国际航权资源双边谈判问题,对谈判双方基于战略谈判关系和价值对等原则的博弈关系进行研究,提出了基于谈判方议价能力、关联产业补偿、产业空间预留价值和资源空置价值耗损4个维度的指标来描述航权资源议题的价值,建立适用于针对不同类型议题的物质收益函数,基于互惠偏好理论,提出互惠动机和单方面施惠动机来描述双方在战略谈判关系下博弈行为带来的心理收益,构建基于互惠心理收益的序贯互惠博弈模型。通过航权资源谈判数值模拟,结果表明:在双方具备互惠关系的情况下,互惠敏感系数、议题航权资源规模及产业空间预留价值与资源空置价值耗损,共同决定了谈判方的博弈行为策略,验证了模型的有效性。研究发现该谈判问题对应6个议题价值博弈场景,议题价值范围是决定谈判对应博弈场景的核心因素。 |
| 关键词: 航权资源 双边谈判 互惠心理 序贯博弈 |
| DOI：10.11918/202112043 |
| 分类号:F560 |
| 文献标识码:A |
| 基金项目:北京首都国际机场股份有限公司项目(T20L01310) |
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| Modeling and analysis of sequential reciprocal game problem of bilateral negotiation for air traffic rights resources |
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ZHAO Jun1,2,CHEN Xumei1,2,LIU Zhishuo1,LUAN Di1
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(1. School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. Key Laboratory of Transport Industry of Big Data Application Technologies for Comprehensive Transport (Beijing Jiaotong University), Beijing 100044, China)
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| Abstract: |
| Considering the problem of negotiation of air traffic rights resources, this paper studies the game relation between the two sides of the negotiation based on the strategic negotiation relationship and the principle of equivalence of value. On the basis of the bargaining power, compensation of related industries, value of reserved space, and lost value by resource vacancy, a method was proposed to describe the value of the issue of air traffic rights resources, and the material income matrix aimed at different types of issues was established. Based on the theory of reciprocal preference, the reciprocal motivation and ex-parte-patronage motivation were proposed to describe the psychological utility brought by the game behaviors of the negotiators in the context of strategic negotiation relationship, and the sequential reciprocal game model based on reciprocal psychological utility was constructed. Numerical simulation was carried out and the validity of the model was verified. Results show that when the two sides of the negotiation were in a reciprocal relationship, the game behavior strategy was decided by the reciprocity sensitivity coefficient, issue scale of air traffic rights resources, and the relationship between the value of reserved space and the lost value by resource vacancy. The negotiation problem was identified to correspond to six value game scenarios, which were mainly determined by the value range of the issue. |
| Key words: air traffic rights resources bilateral negotiation reciprocity sequential game |
